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Abstract
Good planning and proper policy analysis to inform decision makers are important 
elements of policymaking reform. A functional and modern policymaking 
system can only work if it is supported by the proper institutional arrangements. 
In Romania there have been serious failures in policy management under 
the current government apparatus.  This has been largely down to a lack of 
institutional capacity to manage the policy and regulatory process. Underlying 
causes include the absence of a systematic approach to policy formulation, 
institutional corruption, and a pressing need to refi ne and implement civil service 
law. Reforms started in 2003 did benefi t from increased attention and support 
from donors. Their successes have been limited by operational problems 
however, especially in matching agendas and fi nancing activities, and also 
the persistence of bureaucratic resistance. In order to push the reform agenda 
forward the government needs to train and prepare its senior staff and stimulate 
the involvement of competent local personnel in assistance programs. It must 
take full responsibility for increasing its administrative capacity, and cooperate 
with academics and civil society to build a community of policy analysts and 
policy makers. The donor community meanwhile, must establish a clear vision 
for their policy in Romania, offer a better design of programs, and improve 
advertising of their assignments.
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Executive summary
1. Romania and its international partners have allocated signifi cant resources 
to bring about fundamental change in its political and administrative system. The 
scope of this paper is twofold; by assessing crosscutting policymaking reforms, 
I explore the factors behind the success of policy transfer and institutional 
building sponsored by key external stakeholders. The institutional development 
envisaged is signifi cant and can greatly affect Romania’s credibility, stability 
and development in the medium and long term. The international stakeholders 
involved in institutional development are one of the drivers for reform, sometimes 
being the only actors successfully pressing Romanian institutions for change. 
Unfortunately, the full potential of their assistance is not met, sometimes due to 
the traditional problems of assistance delivery embedded in the donor programs 
but more importantly due to internal institutional factors related to the culture, 
capacity and the personnel of the Romanian public institutions. 
2. Following an analysis of core documents augmenting the policy reform 
debate and review of several cases of technical assistance projects developed 
in the Romanian central administration, I come to the conclusion that if it is 
not properly designed and implemented policymaking reform has little chance 
of transforming profound institutional and cultural constructs. The major risk 
is to maintain donor dependence and not be able to produce enough internal 
pressure and demand for better policymaking. For success it is necessary to 
stress the synergy of action between the public sector, civil society, private 
sector and international actors with an emphasis on the capacity of Romanian 
institutions to properly manage their own consolidation and capacity building.
3. By identifying the critical success factors (e.g. political overview and 
support, competence of staff involved) I argue that technical assistance 
programs (widely involving consultancy activity) have to become more fl exible 
and more orientated towards long term institutional capacity building. Special 
attention should be given to attract and motivate staff to work in making technical 
assistance meaningful and useful. By rethinking technical assistance supported 
reforms I propose a set of actions which can push the policymaking reform 
agenda forward.
5CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES / INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2005/06
1 Public sector development in transition 
context
Policymaking reform was never a specifi c topic for literature on governance 
issues.1 Known as policy management, policy development or the policy 
process, the activities envisaged in this paper refer to the patterned activity of 
government in addressing public issues, regardless of the instruments used. The 
more generous management/sector reform assumes a holistic approach which 
questions the architecture of state/society relations, principles of governance 
and even values behind it. Policymaking reform is highly permeable to the more 
general debates, being at home with all the fundamental debates, e.g. Weberian 
vs. New Public Management (NPM) thinking, process vs. results, hierarchies 
vs. networks. 
Along with König, I consider the socialist administration as unifi ed, comprising 
all tiers of the state apparatus, with strong hierarchical controls and subordination 
while maintaining the intertwining of party bureaucracy and state administration, 
with the former having directive authority over the latter (König 1992). Goetz 
stresses that public governance in Central and Eastern Europe transformed itself 
along two paradigmatic lines; Modernization and Europeanization. These two 
are combined within public governance reforms, with the latter actually building 
upon the achievements of the former. The ‘Modernist’ paradigm emphasizes the 
need for radical reform, striving for increasing differentiation of tasks and personnel 
between the political and administrative parts of the executive. It also promotes 
administrative devolution, deconcentration and effective political decentralization. 
The Modernist paradigm favors the establishment of a professional non-
partisan civil service and a redefi nition of the tasks of public administration, with 
the emphasis being on legality, impartiality, objectivity, regularity and a public 
service ethos (Goetz 2001). Europeanization, on the other hand, emerged as 
a major perspective on administrative development in the region and a new 
paradigm beginning in the mid-1990s. According to Grabbe, Europeanization is a 
‘convincing’ administrative paradigm with concrete instruments of infl uence such 
1 I am greatly indebted to several mentors, colleagues and friends who helped me a lot dur-
ing this research. I would like to mention a few here: Leslie Pal, Paul D. Collins, Gary Reid, 
Nicolas Dubois, Ken Sigrist, Mircea Miclea, Victor Giosan, my colleagues from the GSG and 
the Ministry of Education, and the IPF staff and fellows. I would also like to thank several 
Romanian and foreign experts who offered to contribute to this research and openly shared 
both their positive and negative experiences of policymaking reform and consultancy work in 
Romania.
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as benchmarking, monitoring, and the provision of legislative and institutional 
templates, aid and technical assistance (Grabbe 2001).
As Nunberg notes, “Central and Eastern European countries did not 
follow the NPM approach; the implicit systems and models adopted were the 
centralized hierarchies of the Weberian tradition” (Nunberg 1999: 264). The 
acceptance of the bureaucratic establishment by important donors, such as the 
European Commission and the World Bank, appears to be mainly for tactical 
and operational reasons, with the NPM platform being too radical for the well-
enshrined administrative legalism of the post communist countries.
In Romania, policymaking reform encouraged the inclusion of NPM in 
public administration reform. This included stressing the importance of good 
planning across government, proper policy analysis to inform decision making, 
inter-agency functional cooperation and extensive public consultation. Yet, a 
functional and modern policymaking system can only work if it is supported by 
proper institutional arrangements, which do not seem to be in place in Romania. 
2Policymaking reform seems to bring about a paradigmatic clash between the 
New Public Management and Weberian thinking and, further, between the 
policy literate reformists and bureaucratic conservatives. 
2 Romania: the organization of Government
Romania has a semi-presidential regime with a strong tendency towards 
prime-ministerialization, especially when the Prime Minister is also the head of 
the governing / dominant party. The Constitution gives the president a leading 
role in foreign affairs and security issues whilst the Prime Minister assumes full 
authority over economic and social affairs. Currently the number of ministries 
and agencies is unusually high owing to the pressures to accommodate a large 
number of parties and political offi cials seeking offi ce (Romania has had a coalition 
government since 2004). This creates a serious risk of policy fragmentation and 
limited policy effectiveness, in the sense of executive unreliability as defi ned 
by Evans and Manning.3 Relations between government and parliament are 
2 See for example the lengthy and wide-ranging report of the World Bank (2003).
3 Governmental unreliability is defi ned as “the degree to which the broad policy commit-
ments of the executive are either not implemented, or only partially implemented, within a 
reasonable timescale - or if implemented, are prone to rapid reversal” can be reduced. There 
are three methods by which governmental unreliability can be reduced: strengthening the 
institutional arrangements that support collegiality (collective decision-making); designing a 
decision-making process that forces meaningful policy tradeoffs within a realistic fi scal plan; 
and creating effective collegial forums (e.g., government sub-committees) in which such 
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tense, with the government often sidelining parliament, especially in relation to 
priority government activities such as European integration. Under the last two 
administrations, there has been a strong tendency to unify party structures with 
government ones, leading to a weakening of both. Depending on the number of 
parties in the coalition, the government decision-making system is evolving from 
a majoritarian to a consensual logic. The current coalition is fragile and functions 
on two levels, with two dominant parties and two secondary parties. Political 
coordination structures outside government seem to work unsatisfactorily as 
many political disputes/crises are spilling into government activity.4 
Coalitions undoubtedly make the organization of government much more 
complex (SIGMA 1998). The Prime Minister has relatively broad authority over 
ministers, yet the central government structures are undeveloped, and unable 
to support both the Prime Minister and the Cabinet in decision-making. The 
fi rst such supporting structure is the Chancellery of the Prime Minister which is, 
unfortunately, seeking extensive policymaking instead of policy coordination/
review activity.  Recently, the Chancellery has gathered several sectoral 
agencies under its direct coordination to form a special type of ministry, with 
no direct representation in the Cabinet but managing a wide set of issues and 
commanding a sizeable budget. The second supporting structure is the General 
Secretariat, a weak institution in term of policy review capacity, but capable of 
organizing a huge fl ow of documents and recently making bold steps towards 
reforming the policymaking process.5
The ministries do not share a culture of cooperation, preferring to maintain 
an adversarial attitude. Inter-ministerial bodies have tended to function poorly, 
characterized by their large number, diffuse responsibilities and lack of real 
output.  This might well change with the recent restructuring carried out by the 
General Secretariat of the Government. The organization of ministry work is 
interesting. In order to avoid the fragmentation of ministries along party lines 
and to increase coordination, all coalition parties nominated one deputy minister. 
deliberations can occur (Evans and Manning 2002). For an application of this concept see the 
comparative article on two Baltic states in Evans and Evans (2001).
4 The government change in 2004, when a right-leaning coalition replaced in government 
the single ruling Social Democratic Party, increased the fragmentation. Political coordination 
structures were never effi cient in solving inner political confl icts before reaching the govern-
ment level, triggering institutional crises with serious consequences for the credibility of the 
government. One of the most serious one was in the education sector, where the minister 
of education, following an insuffi cient budget allocation resigned in parallel with the longest 
strike mounted for the same reason in the last 15 years.
5 For an excellent overview on the typical coordination functions and structures at the center 
of government level in the region see Ben Gera (2004).
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Up to now, the main result has been to lessen the policy differentiation between 
the coalition parties.
The responsibilities for coordinating important horizontal functions across 
government (including reforms) are split. The coordination of EU affairs is done 
at Prime Minister level, while the bulk of EU integration activity is divided between 
the Ministry of European Integration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry of Public Finances. Public Administration Reform (PAR) is coordinated 
from the Ministry of Administration and Interior through the Central Unit for 
Public Administration Reform (CUPAR), a unit which has relevant expertise 
but could benefi t from a more central position and political clout. Policymaking 
reform is carried actively by the General Secretariat of the Government (GSG) 
through the Public Policy Unit (PPU), doubled by the Chancellery of the Prime 
Minister. The Ministry of Finance coordinates the reform of public expenditure 
management but, to date, its status and achievements are unclear.
3 Failures of policy management in Romania
Romania has been under serious scrutiny during the transitional period. 
The large majority of observers seem to agree that the Romanian policymaking 
system displays all the typical pathologies of weak governance, with particular 
emphasis being on the lack of institutional capacity to manage the policy/
regulatory process. All relevant foreign stakeholders have highlighted serious 
problems in the policymaking process. For example, the World Bank claimed 
that “in the area of public administration, a more systematic approach to 
policy formulation needs to be established and embodied in institutional 
structures and processes, and the Civil Service Law needs to be refi ned and 
implemented” (The World Bank 2004). We can agree with the UK’s Department 
of International Development (DFID), which argued that such problems are 
symptomatic for wider performance constraints within the still heavily centralized 
and politicized public service. Poor pay and incentive structures discourage 
higher caliber staff from joining and remaining with the service. According to the 
DFID Country Strategy Paper, “service delivery concepts are largely absent, 
corruption is prevalent, organizational structures and systems, and budgeting 
and expenditure management systems, require review” (DFID 2000: 2). Finally, 
better systematic linkages between policy making and budgetary processes 
also need to be established.
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As Goetz notes, Romania displays some similar traits to fragile democracies 
in Latin America. These include institutional fragmentation at central level, 
proliferation of specialized agencies outside the main ministerial administration, 
a decoupling between the political and administrative parts of the executive 
and insuffi cient mechanisms for policy co-ordination and for building policy 
coherence at the center (Goetz 2001: 1042). Similar features are to be found in 
several other CEE countries.6
While reviewing several Support for Improvement in Governance and 
Management (SIGMA) reports, Michal Ben Gera asserts that the Romanian 
system for preparing, consulting, reviewing, coordinating and approving policies 
is characterized by weak analytical and coordination capacity and often-
ignored procedures.7 The result is the overproduction of generally low-quality 
and contradictory policy and legislative outputs, leading to implementation 
diffi culties and an enforcement defi cit (Ben Gera 2004). Interestingly, the author 
lists various faults of the Romanian policymaking system as identifi ed by middle 
and top civil servants:
Table 1 Problems of the Romanian legislative and policy-
coordination processes
Weakness/arbitrariness of political direction with respect to strategic priorities 
and policy direction
•
Reluctance of Ministers to resolve confl icts at inter-ministerial committees and 
Government level (the role of parties is important here)
•
Lack of policy development capacity and policy “culture” in the administration, 
including at the level of line ministries where the process starts
•
Preparation of legal drafts normally begins without policy clarity•
Weak internal coordination within Ministries and within “sectors”, due in part 
to structural fragmentation, competition, and lack of clarity in assignment of 
responsibilities
•
Formal and perfunctory inter-ministerial coordination and stakeholder 
consultation
•
Insuffi cient, politicized, and duplicative legal analysis and cross-checking at 
the central level
•
Lack of central policy-coordination, and non-enforcement of procedures under 
the Law on Normative Acts
•
Weak monitoring by the General Secretariat of the Government of 
implementation by Ministries
•
Source: Ben-Gera (2004).
6 For an insightful perspective on Slovak policy management system see Staronova (2002).
7 The most important features identifi ed are:  low capacity of the administration, high level 
of intra-governmental confl ict, weak position of the Parliament, large number, fragmented, 
and insular administrative structures, weak policy capacity of political parties, weakness of the 
horizontal functions (Ben-Gera 2004).
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With regard to political control over the administrative structure, there 
is political control but it tends to be a predatory one. Politicians struggle to 
retrieve information and expertise from the bureaucracy in order to make 
decisions. They are often overwhelmed and unable to keep pace with strategic 
and operational decisions. Top public management is usually politicized and 
a change in governments brings with it a change in leadership and, more 
worryingly, a change in the structure of the agencies. This is due to the very 
peculiar legal framework under which the simplest way to bring about changes 
in top management is to restructure the institution.  The result is a lack of trust/
fi delity between the two actors. Following the elections in 2004 the dominant 
discourse of the new political offi cials stressed the lack of trust of public servants 
towards their institutions; many of them part of questionable administrative 
practices and networks. The institutional response was an extension of the 
advisory services given to ministers and deputy ministers to partially replace 
the fallen-from-grace public servants. 
Overall, there are growing gaps between the administrative culture of 
Romanian institutions, their organizational capacity and the complex pressures 
coming from the environment. There is suffi cient evidence that Romania is 
insuffi ciently equipped for the standards of good and democratic governance 
required in a European administrative system. 
4 Policymaking reform in Romania: dynamics, 
successes and limits
The policy process reform enjoyed an unexpected boost following the 
election in 2004. The new governing program referred to the importance of 
reform emphasizing the need for better policy elaboration and implementation.8 
This meant that the reforms started in 2003 had a good chance to continue. 
The outgoing government had introduced reforms in response to increased 
criticism from international organizations although arguably without any strong 
feeling of ownership on its part. However, the new government has reacted 
promptly and given close attention to the issue. 
These reforms did benefi t from the increased attention and support from the 
major donors in Romania – DFID/WB/EC/SIGMA – and provides the background 
8 In this program there are listed 5 principles: transparency and communication, participa-
tion, responsibility, effi ciency and coherence (Government of Romania 2004).
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example for this policy paper. There are several reasons why this reform is a 
good case study for exploring some of the pathologies of technical assistance 
in Romania.
It is a reform that specifi cally targets the policy making process; 
It is a horizontal reform involving all layers and structures of the central 
administration, that is, the General Secretariat of the Government 
(GSG), the Chancellery of the Prime Minister and the line ministries;
It was the focus for all the major Romanian donors concerning institutional 
development;
It started from zero, by the establishment inside the General Secretariat 
of the Public Policy Unit (PPU) in late 2003, following a strong 
recommendation coming from the SIGMA offi cials;
It challenges the existing institutional procedures and mandates;
It is an incremental reform, building on cumulative gains and 
achievements.
This case offers some good practices in technical assistance. All donors 
communicated with each other and built their programs with previous experiences 
taken into account. The development resembles a snowball effect with one 
donor starting and others following suit when the capacity of that institution is 
tested and set on a right policy track. Streamlining resources from many donors 
brought a sense of continuity and coherence between assistance projects, 
incremental change and development 
The DFID started to assist the GSG by offering consulting services for 
‘strengthening the coordination of public policy and the formulation capacities 
of the General Secretariat of the Government and ministries’. The consultants, 
together with the Prime Minister’s long-time adviser on administrative reform 
issues, contributed to defi ning strategic lines for GSG -PPU activity. The fact that 
they were British and naturally familiarized with central government structures 
in UK helped the staff connect with a vibrant institutional and professional 
experience. The DFID also contributed some highly appreciated and useful 
study trips for GSG staff to virtually all the governments in CEE countries, in an 
attempt to institutionalize peer evaluation and learning.
The switch from the DFID to the World Bank brought maturity to the projects 
by formulating conditionalities around specifi c requirements and deadlines. 
The two conditions referred to the approval of new policy making procedures 
for government activity and the identifi cation of monitoring indicators used 
for judging policymaking reform success. The World Bank involvement also 
integrated the GSG-Public Policy Unit into the policy review of other Bank-
supported reforms such as the reform of the civil service payment system and 
•
•
•
•
•
•
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a revision of the corporate governance regulations. Continuity was assured by 
having the same senior DFID consultant continuing his work within the new 
World Bank project. 
The EC Twinning project took a very long time to design and gain. It was 
further complicated by the change in the government with the EC wanting a 
strong political commitment for continuation of reform. The project was built 
on the experience of the two previous assistance projects. The EC Twinning 
focused on building policymaking capacity at ministry level and sorting out 
relations between the GSG and the Prime Minister Chancellery. It is very 
interesting to note the slightly surprising choice of the Latvian Department of 
Policy Coordination as partner, a structure which apparently combines the 
offi ces of both the GSG and the Chancellery of the Prime Minister. The choice 
was motivated by the need to understand not only well-established models 
of policy coordination but to identify things that work or did not in a similar 
transitional/post communist situation. The project is still in its inception phase 
so assessment is premature.
Support from SIGMA came from the outset, infl uencing all the major products 
of the reform program. The SIGMA leadership was uncomfortable with the fact 
that the GSG was developing its capacities faster than the Chancellery of the 
Prime Minister, a structure which naturally fi ts a coordination role. In the end, 
following the redefi nition of the Chancellery as a ministry, SIGMA accepted any 
vehicle for capacity building for policy coordination at government level.  
There were some, mainly operational, problems in matching agendas 
and fi nancing activities. The ideas of the donors were not always compatible, 
placing the host institution in a delicate position. There were also problems 
when the reform team started to gain more leverage in the GSG, a problematic 
development for the existing structures, mainly responsible with legal review of 
act or organization of the government meetings. Bureaucratic resistance is still 
a constant.
Policymaking reform was and still is a problematic reform program because 
it is not entirely clear what its deliverables are. The policymaking system is 
very complex and Romania, as we saw earlier, has problems on almost all 
accounts. The strategic decision was to focus on policymaking procedures in 
the government activities. After almost two years of preparation, the GSG put 
forward a Government decision (G.D. 775/2005) which essentially forces the 
government agencies to structure their activity around the classical policy cycle. 
Another novelty is the cooperation between the GSG and the line ministries on 
13
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policy documents and procedures. This marks a huge step forward in terms 
of building capacity for coordination at the center of government. This system 
will be soon in place making possible an early evaluation of its success. In the 
following box I present an evaluation of the policymaking reform dimensions 
as they were formulated in a SIGMA report (see previous box for complete 
reference).
Table 2 Problems of the Romanian legislative and policy-
coordination processes and their status
Problem (as identifi ed by Ben Gera, 2004) NA
Weakness/arbitrariness of political direction PA
Reluctance of Ministers to resolve confl icts SA
Lack of policy development capacity and policy “culture” UA
Preparation of legal drafts without policy clarity SA
Weak internal coordination within Ministries and within “sectors” PA
Lack of clarity in the assignment of responsibilities PA
Formal and perfunctory inter-ministerial coordination PA
Stakeholder consultation SA
Insuffi cient, politicized, and duplicative legal analysis and cross-
checking SA
Lack of policy-coordination at the centre PA
Non-enforcement of the procedures required by the Law on 
Normative Acts PA
Weak monitoring by the GSG of implementation by Ministries SA
Not addressed – NA, Partially addressed – PA, Satisfactorily addressed – SA, 
Unsatisfactorily addressed – UA
A key driver of this reform program is the pressure from central government 
on line ministries to form competent interdisciplinary teams of policy analyst/
makers in order to bring coherence and technical depth in the activity of the 
ministry. The Ministries responded unconvincingly, placing a question mark on 
the capacity of the institutions to comply with the new and signifi cantly more 
demanding system. This also shows the direction where further technical 
assistance is needed. Streamlining ministry thinking and policy making is a 
daunting task given the long tradition of hierarchical control and lack of delegation 
in decision making.
There are two possible scenarios. First, the reforms will spillover into other 
areas9 bringing more effi ciency to the policy making process. This is an optimistic 
9 For an interesting mentioning of creation of ‘islands’ or ‘enclaves’ of professionalism 
and technocratic excellence in CEE public administrations in a Europeanization context see 
Grabbe (2001: 1018).
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scenario and much depends on the will of the government to support further 
modernization and the ability of frontrunners to disseminate the products of 
their work. It will probably require a mix of coercive and persuasive means, with 
an emphasis on dissemination inside and outside administration. The second 
scenario is less optimistic and presents a situation where the islands of good 
practice will be further isolated.  Whilst they may remain better linked to each 
other they will be outside the main administrative and policy fl ows. In time, these 
islands will be challenged as highly skilled personnel could leave for better 
positions in the private sector or international administration (with Brussels-
based positions the most likely destinations).
One aspect that needs to be emphasized is that policymaking reform is 
linked to several other reform efforts. The question of coordination remains 
serious, given the variety of actors involved and the complexity of actions 
required. The main reforms are the Public Administration Reform (PAR) and 
Public Expenditure Management. The intersections between policymaking 
reform and public administration reform (PAR) are numerous. PAR concentrates 
more on the structures while PMR focuses on processes. The two cannot 
succeed without each other. PAR is partially inspired by the need for better 
policies and seeks to identify relevant staff and institutions. One of the latest 
synergies created in Romania was the creation of a group of public managers10 
who were sent to the line ministries following training with typical policymaking 
mandates (policy analysis). The extent to which they will be integrated within 
their destination institutions is still uncertain.
There are important intersections between policymaking reform and Public 
Expenditure Management Reform. There is a growing consensus that the 
budgeting process in Romania has to be changed. The Ministry of Finance has 
an adversarial relation with line ministries. There is evidence that budgeting 
activity is not suffi ciently sensible to political inputs. The latest budgetary debates 
in the government have shown that the prioritization carried out at political level 
was not mirrored properly in the budgetary allocations. The intersection between 
the two reforms is obvious and vocally requested by external stakeholders such 
as the World Bank and the European Commission. The two reforms are at 
different stages in maturity, with an earlier start for the PMR part. In principle, 
both ministries and central government will resolve the issues of prioritization 
10 The public managers are in fact graduates of a training scheme –Young Professional 
Scheme, a program strongly supported by the European Commission. The program placed in 
central and local institutions several well trained and better paid young professionals.
15
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long before the Ministry of Finance enters the debate. The latter submits the 
fi nancial ceiling, leaving the prioritization part to the ministries fi rst and to the 
government afterwards. Armed with consistent political input, it will be able to 
assist ministries in designing balanced budgets that take into account priorities 
rather than the diffuse and intimidating budgetary pressures from the sectors.
Reforms to policy making would do well to seek a view from Central and Eastern 
Europe, where neighboring countries may have found similar administrative 
challenges and possible solutions. These countries have carried out limited 
reforms to improve the policymaking process. Looking in the region, we can see 
islands of good practice. Lithuania, for example, managed to create a complete 
and mature strategic planning system. In some cases, the new procedures are 
relevant for other EU member states, as it is usually the transition countries 
that are following the most up-to-date developments in public management. 
A good example is the Estonian paperless Cabinet decision-making system. 
A second lesson is that administrations will enhance their capacities based 
on the specifi c challenges. Lithuania initiated its internationally-assisted reform 
of policy planning following a very serious budgetary crisis which highlighted 
the need for better planning and prioritization (SIGMA, 2004: 2). The need for 
reform can appear when specifi c challenges arise and it is the responsibility of 
key drivers of reform to use such occasions properly.
International donors were the only stakeholders in the policymaking reform 
process. Unfortunately, civil society, the press and academia were ill-prepared 
for such a daunting and complex effort. Civil society pressure, even though 
corrosive of bad policymaking practices, could not gain access to intimate 
processes of decision making. Academia was also ill-prepared, with a note that 
the involvement in the public process reform was merely individual and not 
institutional, mainly as a strategy of controlling exposure of decision making 
to outside scrutiny. Many scholars were co-opted in teams working on policy 
evaluation programs or legislation revisions. Yet their infl uence, in terms of 
mobilizing relevant expertise and usage in policy development, was rather 
volatile and vulnerable to changes of political leadership and priorities.
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5 Policymaking reform: mapping donor 
positions
National governments do look for assistance when their capacity, including 
fi nancial, is severely questioned. Donors can fi ll gaps of expertise and 
this provides most of the background for the success or failure of technical 
assistance.  One the most severe limitations to donor assistance in Romania is 
the extent to which attention to good policymaking will remain high when they 
step back. In this respect Romania is still a donor-dependent country failing to 
assimilate the best practices in policymaking and is not fi nding enough internal 
stakeholders to demand better policy procedures and outcomes. 
Romania does receive substantial external assistance, amounting to 1.64% 
of GNI in 2002, which is second only to Bulgaria in transitional economies. This is 
overwhelmingly provided by the European Union and the World Bank (see Table 
3). They have very different agendas: the EU is almost exclusively concerned 
with the accession agenda, notably the insertion and implementation of the 
acquis into Romanian law, while the World Bank has a development agenda 
oriented towards structural economic change and poverty reduction. The other 
major donor organization is USAID, which has recently started a project in the 
fi eld of decentralization with a budget of US$40million budget over fi ve years. 
Unfortunately, when the Romanian government made important steps toward 
decentralization, the program was closed.
Table 3 Donor assistance to Romania – 1998-2002 ($ million)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Net OA Receipts ($ml) 367 387 432 648 701
WB gross disbursements 352 162 442 238 157
EU PHARE disbursements (Eur) 178 199 257 263
(167) (215) (287) (278)
Source: Net overseas aid fi gures from OECD/DAC statistics, WB from Romania 
country brief, EU from PHARE annual report. There were no signifi cant 
disbursements from other EU programmes during this period. The EU and World 
Bank fi gures are gross, which explains the discrepancies with the OA net fi gures
While there are signifi cant agenda differences between the large donors, 
the World Bank, DFID and other country donors are committed to European 
membership. Although there is no formal structure for overall donor coordination, 
there is good cooperation on public administration reform issues, and the EC is 
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organizing a joint government/donor coordination group in this area. The largest 
bilateral donors are the US, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Japan.
Even though there is no aquis communitaire in public administration, the 
European Commission Delegation in Romania did frame several requirements 
regarding the functioning of public institutions under the political criteria heading. 
The European Commission orientated its strategy to assist Romanian public 
institutions by funding twinning projects, involving, on the Romanian side, the 
Ministry of Interior and lately the GSG. Under this umbrella, the EC developed 
through SIGMA a baseline system, with the purpose of substantiating the 
monitoring and reporting process. The EC steers its assistance towards state 
building capacity for proper functioning inside the Union. The Open Coordination 
method requires a certain level of maturity.11 The recent member states from 
CEE are apparently less ready than expected for this system.
The EU has provided plenty of direction to CEE countries through the 
technical assistance offered by the PHARE programme, and through the 
twinning programme that started in 1999. ‘Twinning’ is aimed at helping CEE 
administrative and democratic institutions to adapt to membership requirements 
by assimilating other European democracies experiences of policymaking and 
adapting their national legislation to the acquis. The most valuable feature of 
the programs is that policy transfer is done through secondment of civil servants 
from older EU states to the accession states. In practice, the twinning projects 
are implemented using extensive consultancy input and less government. For 
a list of PHARE projects supported by the European Commission (please see 
the Table 4). 
The Support for improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA) 
is a joint initiative of the European Union and the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, principally fi nanced by the European Union. 
SIGMA provides support to partner countries in their efforts to modernize public 
governance systems. It acts on important dimensions of public administration 
and general policy monitoring. SIGMA focuses on four sub-areas: policy and 
strategic capacities; co-ordination structures; regulatory reform, including 
impact assessment; and management of EU integration. It targets central 
government and ministries with signifi cant horizontal functions such as the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Administration and Interior. Their activity 
is also directed towards improving methodologies, especially on budgetary and 
social impact evaluation.
11 For an interesting discussion see Radelli (2004).
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In Romania, when assessing policy-making and co-ordination mechanisms, 
SIGMA uses a  baseline system composed of: coherence of the policy-making 
framework, inter-ministerial consultation on policy proposals, agenda planning, 
dispute resolution mechanisms, central co-ordination capacity, central strategic 
capacity, co-ordination of European affairs, involvement of the council of 
ministers in budget decisions, production and impact assessment of normative 
acts. The yearly reports drafted by SIGMA were very valuable in helping design 
the strategic and operational plans for policymaking reform carried out by the 
GSG. For a detailed description of SIGMA recent activities in Romania (see box 
5).
The World Bank approached the institutional reforms in Central and Eastern 
Europe with skepticism. Its usual experience in the developing countries was 
proven limited when it had to deal with the far more complex institutional 
features of the post-communist states. The efforts towards institution building 
arose by trying to reach other core objectives: macroeconomic stabilization, 
liberalization and privatization (The World Bank, 2000: 102). These strategic 
lines were believed to gradually increase the demand for better governance 
and institutional performance in the newly democratic states. The Bank’s recent 
conceptual reorientation from supporting ‘best practice’ to ‘good fi t’ has further 
limited the scope for pursuing a comprehensive NPM-inspired approach. 
The performance of technical assistance projects for institutional building is 
acknowledged as being generally poor. Following a process of institutional 
evaluation, the Bank decided to focus more on institutional building by developing 
core government functions and strengthening policymaking, regulatory and 
service delivery (as in Azerbaijan, Albania, Bulgaria, and Russia). In Romania, 
its attention on institution building and governance reform was also part of its 
broad aim to develop a culture of accountability in the public sector (The World 
Bank, 2004).
The most important step the World Bank took to support institutional 
development and governance reform was the fi rst Programmatic Adjustment 
Loan (PAL), approved by the Bank’s Board in August, 2004. The PAL has explicit 
governance and institutional development aims in the area of legal reform, civil 
service reform, strengthening transparency and governance through laws on 
declaration of assets and confl ict of interest, and regulatory reform in the energy 
sector. It is worth noting that the PAL program was designed together with the 
EU. PAL 2 is the second in a series of three PALs designed to support the reform 
program up to 2007. The PAL program supports the Government’s overarching 
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objectives of establishing solid economic growth, reducing poverty and joining 
the EU. With strong support from the PAL program, Romania is pursuing a broad 
reform agenda, including institutional, governance and economic restructuring 
reforms, which are anchored in the process of EU accession (see box 6). At this 
stage, however, we can only say that the PAL appears highly relevant for the 
success of the policymaking reform in Romania, yet, it is too soon to assess its 
effi cacy (The World Bank, 2005: 26).
The UK’s DFID was an important actor in the donor community until it 
closed its Romanian offi ce in 2004. Even so, its activity did leave important 
traces in the public sector in Romania. Using a very interesting strategy, the 
DFID opened lots of doors for future donor intervention, especially the World 
Bank.  The reason the DFID intervened in Romania is partly due to the fact that 
the government saw public administration reform and legislative measures as 
the basis for an independent civil service. Though advanced on some issues, 
progress has so far been limited, thereby leaving room for assistance. The 
purpose of the DFID actions (DFID, 2000: 2)  was to increase the capacity of 
government (central, regional and local), civil society and the private sector to 
carry out and sustain the transition whilst ensuring that social dimensions are 
also properly addressed (see box 7)
By an intelligent combination of expertise and fl exibility, the DFID managed 
to fi nd a place in the donor landscape and become a good partner for other 
institutions (EC, World Bank, IMF and EBRD). The Country Strategy Paper set 
out to orient the programme on the basis of the DFID comparative advantage 
(Gray, 2004: 36), which includes: fl exibility, a willingness to take risks, quality of 
DFID advisers and quality of technical assistance. Despite several shortcomings, 
the DFID’s work is considered to be of great value for the Romanian central 
agencies.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is a special actor 
in the process of policy making reform. Its prospective focus on democratic 
governance brings an inclusive dimension to policymaking reform with a focus 
on disadvantaged groups. The inclusion of the UNDP in our list was also due 
to the visionary involvement in policy planning issues assisting the Presidency 
of Romania. The UNDP assessment of policymaking in Romania seems very 
accurate: at the root of much of Romania’s development and EU accession 
challenges is the quality of democratic governance and, particularly, the capacity 
to transform laws and newly created institutions into effectively implemented 
public policy (United Nations, 2004). Under the program Capacity building for 
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democratic governance priority area (United Nations, 2004: 4) the UNDP sought 
to further strengthen coordination in policy formulation and implementation in 
order to bring about sustainable improvements in public service delivery (see 
Table 8) at national and local level.
6 Factors infl uencing Technical assistance 
(TA) effectiveness
I now move to several TA projects placed in Romanian central agencies.12 
They bring very interesting perspectives on the reform processes involving 
policymaking. However, there are specifi c problems with any kind of assistance 
project. Ignorance from the political level and a de-motivating difference of 
income between those working on the both sides of the projects are only two 
reasons TA can go wrong. We can add cultural and sometimes linguistic barriers 
to those. From the analysis of several cases I have identifi ed some factors 
which can help understand the success of consultancy services.
On the government part, there is evidence of general limited awareness on 
what the role of the technical assistance should be. Secondly, there is little or 
no institutional retrieval of assistance expertise and practices and also a limited 
capacity to mobilize relevant information (e.g. statistics) to give the technical 
assistant the opportunity to produce and deliver relevant inputs.
As a DFID report shows, the main lesson is that in small country programs the 
critical resource is human rather than fi nancial (Gray, 2004: vii). Finding the best 
staff in terms of competence, motivation, and involvement is the key to success. 
On the consultancy part, there are situations where the consultants are chosen 
from a limited pool. This might produce problems as the consultants can have 
lesser relevant experience. An additional problem is when more experienced 
consultants lose interest in the success of the cooperation. On the government 
part the situation is more problematic. Every case reviewed had problems, 
ranging from lack of language skills to animosity towards the consultants (hidden 
but extremely detrimental). The analysis shows that when engaging in such 
12 The conclusions in this section are a result of reviewing several TA programs involving 
long term consultancy in central agencies (General Secretariat of the Government and the 
Chancellery of the Prime Minister: 4 projects, Ministry of Administration and Interior, including 
its subordinate structures: 3 projects, the Ministry of Education and Research: 2 projects, the 
Ministry of Finance: 1 project, the Presidency of Romania: 1 project). During the interviews 
several other consultancy experiences were discussed, enlarging signifi cantly the TA central 
agency picture.
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projects, local staff need to have signifi cant previous preparation to understand 
the consultant’s mandate and the nature of the contract, including deliverables. 
One key action in limiting resistance is to involve all relevant staff in defi ning the 
terms of references used in the procurement procedures.
When there is sincere political commitment to change TA becomes more 
successful.  One key action is to constantly update responsible politicians with 
details of the project. Another scenario is when top offi cials use consultants 
against or as a replacement for civil servants. This is very detrimental for 
institutions but very likely in many cases.  Consultants are often better prepared 
and enjoy more trust than a typical transition civil servant.
TA seems more successful in times of change, especially after elections. 
The momentum for change is greater when new people come into government. 
Given the prestige and general objectivity of the external experts they are the 
fi rst to be consulted. As time passes, the drive for institutional and policy change 
naturally decreases. Contracting out before elections could be a bad idea but it 
is preferable if the policy issue is important and needs immediate attention.
TA seems to work better as it comes closer to the center of government. In-
line ministries seem to be more opaque and resistant to change and cooperation. 
The horizontal ministries which have core functions in the administration of 
government activity such as the Ministry of Justice and especially the Ministry 
of Finance are the most reluctant and opaque to external advice. This is due to 
their specifi c organizational culture and also has to do with negotiation potential 
inside government translated to the agency-donor relations. An important factor 
is professional and even national pride that turns experts into adversaries. 
Central government institutions are more sensitive to consultants and donors in 
general, being much more under scrutiny from them and the public. 
TA seems to work better with civil servants in their early careers (more bluntly, 
with younger people than the average) and holding less important positions. 
They are willing to learn more, but usually they do not have top management 
responsibilities. The consequence is that sometimes several years pass before 
an idea or report is used in policy thinking and execution.  All the interested 
people should be involved in the consultancy work. 
Paradoxically, TA seems to work better with ‘fi rst timers’ rather than ‘second’ 
or ‘third timers’, in the sense that with time, the satisfaction with TA seems 
to decrease in institutions receiving repeat assistance. This might be a result 
of bad experiences towards TA. TA can create high expectations with less 
palpable results/gains. The question of payment is one of the hottest in terms 
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of success. The reaction of local staff when consultant fees become known is 
overwhelmingly negative. Part of the solution is to try to spread benefi ts, mostly 
non-fi nancial, which can be tricky. Contributing to the department’s library with 
the latest books in the fi eld can be a gesture for opening ways for professionals 
and personal communication.  
Related to this, TA seems to be channeled to a small number of institutions/
structures who are seen as more open/professional or they have a ‘reformist 
nature’ by its mandates. An effect is the ‘assistance fatigue’ when staff are 
overwhelmed with activities associated with TA. The other side of the coin is 
donor dependence, which can be installed if institutions are not able to function 
normally without outside expertise. In Romania, such cases are limited but they 
do challenge all stakeholders to harmonize their policies and responsibilities
TA works better when it is associated with non-conventional type of assistance 
usually involving various learning methods like study trips, team building and 
conference participation. Professional learning is most successful when it is 
done outside the normal work environment, inherently bureaucratic and legalistic 
in Romania. Learning also means a possible alteration of authority positions for 
those who have to learn more and quicker, the heads of departments. Taking 
them out of their usual work environment can be a good solution to get their 
attention and interest.
There is a general mood, especially amongst the more experienced Romanian 
staff working in TA projects, of preferring consultants from Central and Eastern 
Europe instead of Western ones. This is due to the fact that several national 
administrations from the region advanced signifi cantly of relevant reform items. 
The rationale behind it is that Romanian institutions with maturity do not want to 
‘reinvent the wheel’ and prefer peer experiences from the region. International 
donors might turn this into policy and promote all consultancies or consultants 
to be from the region.
7 Policymaking reform reloaded: lessons 
learned from TA analysis
Considering the elements discussed above, both on policymaking reform 
and the factors infl uencing the success of technical assistance projects, I list 
a few recommendations for further improvement of the policymaking reform in 
Romania. 
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The donor community should:
Establish a clear vision of donor policy in Romania. There should be 
regular meetings and even common documents stating core procedures 
and policies which should be communicated to the Romanian 
Government and the public in order to facilitate proper assimilation. 
The donor community should be aware of the different policy models 
available on the market and try to coordinate their delivery as not to 
create confusion in the recipient institutions. It also should avoid 
overlapping or competition in assistance.
Better assess of institutional needs and better design of programs is 
necessary. This includes building more local capacity for policymaking 
at expert level. Given their institutional clout, promote more actively at 
the political level the use of good policymaking practices. More capacity 
means the knowledge of Romanian experts should be operational at the 
end of the program (possibly spending more on training stages within 
the country and abroad)
Better advertise their assignments as to assure a larger pool of 
professionals who are suffi ciently competent and available to provide 
the consultancy services.
The Romanian Government should:
Train and better prepare its senior staff on what technical assistance 
entails and what are its advantages. This should be communicated 
by the Romanian government (preferably the General Secretariat 
of the Government and / or the Chancellery of the Prime Minister) 
in conjunction with its public administration reform strategy and the 
European integration priority measures. The National Institute for 
Administration should include in its offerings modules on technical 
assistance procedures formats and advantages.
Stimulate the involvement of competent Romanian staff in assistance 
programs.
Create, by subcontracting to think thanks or universities, a public policy 
portal where you can gather evidence of advanced methodologies and 
good practices initiated in Romanian public institutions.  Subsequently 
the Romanian government should create a documentary center, where 
all reports of such projects are kept and disseminated. 
More generally the Romanian government should not abandon both 
PMR and PAR reform even after gaining membership of the European 
Union. Romania has to perform on a more complex set of tasks after 
integration than before. 
It is crucial that the Romanian government take full responsibility for 
increasing its administrative capacity and its ability to solve problems. 
We need individual proactive strategies to link themselves to similar 
institutions in Europe and engage in extensive peer cooperation.
Create government policy structures and networks at ministry/agency 
level which offer an interactive basis for cooperation.
In cooperation with the academics and civil society, build a community 
of policy analysts and policy makers, to facilitate communication and 
the retention of gained expertise, technical and political.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Table 4 PHARE Projects Strengthening Administrative Capacity 
(selection)
2003 2003-005-551.04.06 Social Dialogue
2003-005-551.04.04 Statistical system
2003-005-551.03.04 Ministry of Public Finance
2003-005-551.03.01 CUPAR and reform network
2002 Project 2002/000-586.03.01 Strengthening the Romanian administrative 
capacity to manage, monitor and assess EU fi nanced programmes
Project 2002/000-586.03.02 Decentralization and development of the 
Romanian local public administration
Project 2002/000-586.03.03 Further institutional strengthening of the Court 
of Accounts
Project 2002/000-586.03.04 Support for the Strategic Plan of the Ministry 
of Public Finance
Project 2002/000-586.03.05 Strengthening and extension of the SAPARD 
programme implementation system
2001 RO-0106.01 Strengthening the institutional capacity of the Ministry of 
Public Administration
RO-0106.02 Develop an operational National Institute of Public 
Administration capable of educating competent civil servants
RO-0106.03 Creating a Corps of Professional Public Managers within the 
Civil Service
RO-0106.04 Design and implement mechanisms for the full application of 
the Civil Servants Statute Law
RO-0106.05 Strengthening the Capacity of the Romanian Ombudsman
RO-0106.06 Project Preparation Facility, Project Cycle Management 
Training and Facility for Short- and Medium-Term Twinning (“Twinning 
Light”)
RO0106.07 Strengthening the Romanian institutional capacity to apply 
the measures foreseen within the National Plan for Agriculture and Rural 
Development
Source: European Commission, Enlargement, Project Fiches ,http://europa.eu.int/
comm/enlargement/fi che_projet/index.cfm?page=415460&c=ROMANIA
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Table 5 Sigma Activities: Romania
Design of Reform Public Administration Reform 2005 (February 2005 
– ongoing)
Public Administration Reform (November 2001 – May 
2005)
External Audit and 
Financial Control
OLAF Anti-fraud Training Seminars (March 2005 – 
ongoing)
Assistance in Drafting National Anti-Fraud Strategy and 
Improving Legal Framework for Recovery of EU Funds 
(October 2004 – August 2005)
Peer Assistance for the Public Internal Financial Control 
(PIFC) and Internal Audit Systems (July 2003 - February 
2005)
Assistance in Setting up and Accreditation of SAPARD 
Agency and related National Fund Systems and 
Procedures (April 2001 – December 2003)
Legal Framework, 
Civil Service and 
Justice
Civil Service Development, 2004-2006 (October 2004 
– ongoing)
Strengthening State Civil Service Management (continued) 
(September 2004 – ongoing)
Drafting ToR for 2nd phase Young Professionals Scheme 
(May 2004 – September 2004)
Strengthening the State Civil Service Management System 
(January 2002 – September 2004)
Drafting Fiches for Phare Assistance 2001 (Civil Service) 
(May 2001 – January 2002)
Policy-making 
and Co-ordination 
Capacities
Support to Policy-making: Follow-up to PM Briefi ng 
(August 2005 – ongoing)
Support to Reform of the Centre of Government (June 
2005 – ongoing)
Briefi ng Future Prime Minister on PAR (November 2004 
– February 2005)
Strengthening Capacities of the Policy-Making System 
(October 2003 – May 2005)
Strengthening the Administrative Capacity of the Senate 
(October 2003 – May 2005)
Conference organised by the European Institute of 
Romania (October 2004 – November 2004)
Review of the Administrative Capacity of Parliament (June 
2001 – April 2002)
Public Expenditure 
Management
Feasibility and Methodology for Introducing Accrual 
Accounting (November – December 2001)
Public 
Procurement
Procurement – Enhancement of General Legal and 
Administrative Capacity (September 2001 – January 2002
Source: SIGMA, Sigma Activities: Romania http://www.sigmaweb.org/document/8/
0,2340,en_33638100_33638200_35045192_1_1_1_1,00.html
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Table 6 World Bank Private and Public Sector Institution Building 
Loan Project (PPIBL) – Romania
Comprehensive private/public sector salary survey•
Development of comprehensive court statistics and objective system for 
monitoring judicial performance
•
Extension of review and implementation of tariff methodologies project•
Functional capacity assessment of national securities commission (CNVM) 
and development of multi-year building program of the banking system
•
High level technical assistance in assessing the effect of privatization.•
High level technical assistance in managing the privatization process•
Implementation of the country action plan to enhance quality of fi nancial 
reporting
•
Intellectual property rights version 5.0•
Monitoring and implementation of the programmatic adjustment loan•
Preparing a feasibility study of proposed partial credit guarantee facility for 
local govt. debt
•
Preparing feasibility study of proposed partial risk guarantee facility for local 
utility debt fi nanced investments
•
Privatization of the Romanian savings bank (CEC SA)•
Rationalization of the Romanian court system•
Senior adviser to improve the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Public 
Finance and line ministries for strategic management
•
Services for improvement of the supervision capacity of the Romanian 
insurance commission
•
Strengthening the coordination of public policy and formulation capacities of 
the General Secretariat of the Government and ministries
•
Study on health fi nancing in order to offer decision-makers actual dynamic 
image
•
TA to the national securities commission for the development of bond market•
Technical assistance for the development of secondary mortgage market in 
Romania
•
Technical assistance for CNVM institutional harmonization with EU and 
international institutions-setting up an arbitrage chamber
•
Technical assistance for national roll-out of case based mechanism for 
hospitals fi nancing
•
Technical assistance to the National Securities Commission for public 
awareness campaign
•
Source: World Bank Romania, World Bank Private and Public Sector Institution 
Building Loan Project (PPIBL)  http://www.worldbank.org.ro
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Table 7 DFID assistance projects (selection) 
A. Sub-Period 
1997/8–1999/2000
MIS 540041: Center for Improvement of Management 
Performance
MIS 550035: RBI Distance Learning
MIS 532001: Assistance to media
MIS 550016: OU/CODECS Training
MIS 550019: Education Reform Pre-University
MIS 555010: Emergency Services
MIS 540053: Ministry of Finance Diagnostic
MIS 542024: Support for Administration Reform
MIS 540054: SME Sector Development
MIS 542034: Romanian Auto Register
MIS 555009: General Practice Management
MIS 542041: Criminal Justice Reform
MIS 542030: Post Offi ce Consultancy
MIS 540059: Enterprise Reform in Romania
MIS 501018: Cleaner Production
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
B. Sub-Period 
2000/1–2002/3
MIS 540060: Local Education Finance
MIS 508001: Local and Regional Partnership
MIS 542052L Assistance to Probation
MIS 542057: Mining (Social Mitigation)
MIS 559010: Romania Social development Fund
MIS 501022: Environmental Management in 
Municipalities (LA21)
MIS 540065: Romania Accountancy band Audit 
Reform
MIS 543055: Assistance to Mine Closure
MIS 542060: Romania Child Protection
MIS 542067 Institutional Support to MOLSS
MIS 501020 Strengthening Capacity in Environmental 
Project \Design
Technical Assistance to the PM’s offi ce
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Source: John Gray (2004) Evaluation of DFID country programmes. Country study: 
Romania 1997-2003
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Table 8 UNDP Major programme areas 2005-2009. Capacity 
building for democratic governance area
 
Source: United Nations. Country Programme Document for Romania (2005-2009)
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